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A comparative study of higher education
Abstract
During my undergraduate career at Eastern Michigan University, I have had the privilege to study various
aspects of public higher education through my public administration degree work. Most of that work has
focused on the state of Michigan alone, giving me only one perspective on the inner workings of state
colleges and universities. By the beginning of my final year, there were many questions that I had yet to
answer because of my “domestic” focus on Michigan. Why are there so many schools in the state of
Wisconsin that are called the University of Wisconsin? Are all universities independent from each other
like the ones in Michigan are? Does any university allow students on its Board of Regents? This senior
thesis is my opportunity to research and learn the answers to many of my questions regarding public
higher education.
Since many of my questions are quite vague and have expansive responses, I have narrowed my study
down to three case-study states: Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan. I also have ruled out any institutions that
are not 4-year universities, in order to focus my analysis. Including the 2-year colleges and other
institutions would lead this study into other directions that would not fit into the scope of my questions.
Each of the three states has a distinct method of administering its public institutions of higher education.
I will begin this study with rationale for choosing these three states as the paradigm for my research.
Since many of my questions are of a similar nature, I have divided the majority of my research into two
categories. The first category is governance, and revolves around issues such as the power structure
within each state, including the division of authority and the makeup of the higher levels of administration.
Secondly, I will analyze the funding and budget processes occurring in each state as they relate to higher
education. While there are other issues that should be considered, the governance and funding issues are
at focus in this study.
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Introduction
During my undergraduate career at Eastern Michigan University, I have had the
privilege to study various aspects of public higher education through my public
administration degree work. Most of that work has focused on the state of Michigan
alone, giving me only one perspective on the inner workings of state colleges and
universities. By the beginning of my final year, there were many questions that I had yet
to answer because of my “domestic” focus on Michigan. Why are there so many schools
in the state of Wisconsin that are called the University of Wisconsin? Are all universities
independent from each other like the ones in Michigan are? Does any university allow
students on its Board of Regents? This senior thesis is my opportunity to research and
learn the answers to many of my questions regarding public higher education.
Since many of my questions are quite vague and have expansive responses, I have
narrowed my study down to three case-study states: Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan. I
also have ruled out any institutions that are not 4-year universities, in order to focus my
analysis. Including the 2-year colleges and other institutions would lead this study into
other directions that would not fit into the scope of my questions. Each of the three
states has a distinct method of administering its public institutions of higher education. I
will begin this study with rationale for choosing these three states as the paradigm for my
research. Since many of my questions are of a similar nature, I have divided the majority
of my research into two categories. The first category is governance, and revolves
around issues such as the power structure within each state, including the division of
authority and the makeup of the higher levels of administration. Secondly, I will analyze
the funding and budget processes occurring in each state as they relate to higher
5

education. While there are other issues that should be considered, the governance and
funding issues are at focus in this study.

The Case Studies
Rationale
Before I begin examining and discussing the various structures of public higher
education that are implemented by the states of Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, I should
first like to explain the rationale behind using those cases as the paradigm for my
research. There are six main reasons behind choosing these states to analyze.
First, there is the simple fact that these states are all geographically located in the
Great Lakes region. This helps control out climate, economic variation, local resources,
and other potential influences that would be in play if I were comparing, say, Michigan
and Florida, or other states that clearly exist in very different parts of the country and are
affected by quite different agents. For example, hurricane season could cause various
policies and philosophies to exist for the Florida higher education system, but there
would be nothing that is comparable in Michigan, where the worst possible natural
disaster involves the dumping of several feet of snow. The Great Lakes States deal with
similar issues and thus are easier to compare because of it.
Secondly, these states have different structures of public higher education. This
provides an excellent opportunity to compare and contrast various structures. The three
state structures are also commonly found throughout the country, so as far as general
6

operation of the structure goes, they act as paradigm cases to reflect the nation’s other
state higher education structures. The specific structures are discussed in detail later.
The third reason these states are comparable is because Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin have higher education structures of similar size. Speaking only of 4-year
universities and colleges, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio have 15, 13, and 13 institutions
respectively. This is important because the distinctly different structures of higher
education implemented by each state are serving a similar number of institutions as its
peer states, ruling out any variance due to significantly larger or smaller structures.
Because there are a similar number of universities in each state, we do not have to take
much consideration into the possibility that the choice to implement one structure over
another was made because there are only a few schools, compared to another structure
that is used to serve twenty schools.
Similar to reasoning on the basis of the size of the structure, the three states have
a reasonably equivalent number of students that are enrolled in each state’s public higher
education institutions. Again discussing 4-year institutions only, Wisconsin serves more
than 155,000 students, Ohio has enrolled more than 250,000 students, and Michigan’s
higher education structure has nearly 280,000 students. 1 This is important again because
of variance due to structure size.
The final two reasons for choosing Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio as paradigm
cases for this study have to do with money. As I will discuss later, state spending and
tuition are connected, and these three states have comparable total state spending and

1

Enrollment information from individual university and system websites, 2008
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student tuition levels. As noted in the table below, the state of Michigan spends more
than $1.5 billion on its 15 public universities, while its students pay an average tuition
rate of $7,504 2 . Ohio appropriates nearly $1.4 billion on its 13 universities, with students
in that state paying average tuition rates of $9,010. Finally, the state of Wisconsin spends
more than $1 billion on its 13 4-year colleges, and students attending them pay $6,048 in
tuition on average 3 .

State
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin

# of
Universities
15
13
13

Student
Population
280,000
253,000
170,000

Average
Tuition
$7,504
$9,010
$6,048

Total State
Spending
$1.5 billion
$1.4 billion
$1 billion

Aside from these six main points, there are two other similarities in the three
states that should also be noted. First, according to the ratings which are granted to state
economies by Forbes, the three states rank closely in the national rankings of state
economic status. The economies are rated on characteristics such as the general quality
of life and cost of living, labor availability and unemployment rates, potential for growth,
and business taxation levels. Forbes ranks Michigan overall at 45th, Wisconsin at 39th,
and Ohio at 34th (Forbes, 2006). The other similarity among the three states is regarding
the college and university rankings produced by U.S. News and World Report each year.
Each state has at least one university in the list of the top 100 institutions, according to
the magazine. The University of Michigan is ranked 25th, the University of Wisconsin-

2

Average tuition figures are calculated for full-time enrolled students, 2006-2007 academic year
Average tuition figures from National Center for Education Statistics; State appropriation figures from
Chronicle of Higher Education, 2007

3
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Madison is 38th, and Ohio State University is ranked 57th. While these two comparisons
are not as significant as the six previously discussed, state economic ratings and national
reputations of institutions do play a role in many areas of higher education structural
operations and philosophies.
I have chosen to study three states, all within a geographical region, with very
different public higher education structures, each of similar size in both the number of 4year institutions and student populations, and all with similar state appropriation and
average tuition rate figures. I will now examine each state and its public higher education
structure in detail.

Wisconsin, the System State
State Institutions and Estimated Enrollment, 2007 4
Eau Claire
10,500
Platteville
Green Bay
5,500
River Falls
La Crosse
10,000
Stevens Point
Madison
41,500
Stout
Milwaukee
28,000
Superior
Oshkosh
12,500
Whitewater
Parkside
5,000

7,100
6,500
9,100
8,500
2,700
10,700

The public higher education structure that the state of Wisconsin operates is one
that encompasses all of its 13 4-year and 13 other institutions into one organization,
which is called the University of Wisconsin System. Each university and college is
called the University of Wisconsin with the campus location included in its name. For
example, the largest campus of the UW system is named the University of Wisconsin 4

Enrollment Data from the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Information Paper 36 (2007)
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Madison, while other universities within the state include names like the University of
Wisconsin – Superior, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee. The 4-year universities
and the 2-year community colleges are all part of the University of Wisconsin system, but
for the purposes of this study, I focus on the 4-year institutions.
At the top of the University of Wisconsin system is the UW Board of Regents.
This entity serves as the administration to the entire system and oversees operations and
policy for all of the UW system institutions. The universities each have their own set of
administrators, specifically Chancellors who serve as the heads of their respective
institutions, but all report up to the Board of Regents. As I will discuss more thoroughly
in the governance and policy segment of this report, the Chancellors and campus
administrators are granted a minimal authority to enact policies and govern their schools
(the UW Board of Regents, however, still sets the guidelines and boundaries for such
authority).
The University of Wisconsin system has not historically been a comprehensive
system of operation. The original University of Wisconsin was created in 1848 and
evolved into several campuses by the mid 1900s, with larger locations in Madison, Green
Bay, Milwaukee, and Parkside, along with ten smaller 2-year campuses. Additionally, a
separate entity known as the Wisconsin State Universities was founded in 1857 as a body
of normal (teacher education) schools. By the end of the 1920s, the normal schools had
grown into full educational colleges, thus becoming the Wisconsin State Colleges. Then,
in 1964, the nine Wisconsin State Colleges became the Wisconsin State Universities with
the addition of other academic programs aside from teacher education and liberal arts.

10

Prior to 1971, there existed in the state of Wisconsin two systems of public higher
education. There was the University of Wisconsin system, covering the more general
degree institutions, and the Wisconsin State Universities, made up mostly of teacher
education institutions and liberal arts colleges. Each system had its own board of control,
similar to the current UW Board of Regents, and each collective of public universities
and colleges operated independently of one other. As a result of legislation passed in
1971, these two entities merged to become the organization that is now the University of
Wisconsin system, and each campus was renamed to their respective current names 5 .
While the merger of the two higher education systems occurred in 1971, debate
over the idea of bringing the two entities together began shortly after the end of World
War II. In 1949 Governor Rennebohm proposed that a “super board” be created to
oversee the functioning of all of the public higher education in Wisconsin, following his
commission on education’s analysis of other states with similar structures, including the
state of Ohio 6 . The rationale behind this proposal was that with the hordes of soldiers
returning from war and heading to college with help from the GI Bill financial aid
packages, the state of Wisconsin needed more stable and centralized control over its
public higher education. The solution to Rennebohm and his commission was to create
an oversight board of control, similar to what exists today as the UW Board of Regents.
The debate over merging went on for two decades, with opponents standing
steadfast in favor of leaving the structure of public higher education in the state of
Wisconsin as it existed. They were fearful of dampening the quality of education offered

5
6

About the UW System, University of Wisconsin (2008)
The UW System Merger, The University of Wisconsin: a history (1999)
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by the two systems if the operations and organization of administration were to be
altered. In 1971, however, newly-elected Governor Lucey proposed once again (in his
state-of-the-state address) that the two higher education systems be combined and an
overarching body of governance be established. He claimed that it was imperative to
merge the systems in order to stabilize the quality of education in similar programs
offered by the different systems. With this, Lucey also was aiming to severely reduce the
costs associated with education on the taxpayers in the time of heavy inflation and
economic downturn that resulted from the war taking place in Vietnam. Fiscal problems
eventually became the main force behind the acceptance of the merger, and what exist
today as the University of Wisconsin system and the UW Board of Regents were created.

Michigan, the Autonomous State
State Institutions and Estimated Enrollment, 2007 7
Central Michigan
28,000
Oakland
Eastern Michigan
23,000
Saginaw Valley
Ferris State
11,000
Univ. of Michigan Ann Arbor
Grand Valley State
20,000
Univ. of Michigan Dearborn
Lake Superior State
3,500
Univ. of Michigan Flint
Michigan State
45,000
Wayne State
Michigan Technological 6,500
Western Michigan
Northern Michigan
9,500

17,000
9,500
39,000
8,500
6,400
33,000
26,000

The way that the state of Michigan organizes its institutions of public higher
education is the complete opposite of Wisconsin’s system structure. Rather than have
only one overarching board of governance for all of the universities, each of Michigan’s
fifteen public universities has its own governing board of regents or trustees, with one
7

Enrollment Data from the President’s Council of the State Universities of Michigan.
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exception. There are three of the fifteen campuses that share one board of regents,
similar to the University of Wisconsin system. These campuses are the University of
Michigan – Ann Arbor, University of Michigan – Flint, and University of Michigan –
Dearborn. As I will discuss more thoroughly in the budget and financing section of this
paper, however, the three University of Michigan campuses do not function together the
same way the University of Wisconsin system does, since each campus is treated by the
state government as an autonomous institution with regard to funding allocation line
items and capital projects. Each campus administration within the University of
Michigan system is also granted much more authority in determining institutional policy
than the campuses in the University of Wisconsin system, but while also all reporting to
the University of Michigan Board of Regents for policies and issues such as tuition rates,
academic curriculum approval, and budgeting.
Because of the fact that each Michigan public university has its own board of
governance, and because those boards are given autonomous authority in its decisionmaking ability, I have labeled Michigan the “autonomous state” for future comparison
between the three case study states discussed in this paper. While Michigan’s first
universities were created in the early 1800s, the rationale behind this autonomy of
institutional authority comes from the 1850 state constitutional convention, where
delegates demanded a change in policy toward higher education since too much conflict
(as a result of political influences) was causing enrollment and quality of education at the
University of Michigan to drop. University of Michigan was then given autonomy from
the government to determine its own policies, tuition rates, and budget, and was the first
institution in the country to be given such authority. From then on, each university that
13

was developed was given this traditional autonomous authority as a way to keep “politics
out of the classroom” and encourage educational experts, not politicians, to be the
operatives and administrators of the public institutions of higher education 8 . Today, each
of the fifteen universities is able to decide how to use the appropriations given from the
state legislature, set tuition rates, and change institutional policies without much political
intervention from lawmakers and other branches of the state government (aside from
general laws that impact higher education when enacted, such as employment
requirements, state financial aid programs, standards of accreditation, etc.)
Given the previously mentioned exception with the University of Michigan
campuses sharing a governing board, the thirteen governing boards are given expressed
power to govern and control their respective universities by the state constitution that was
ratified in 1963. The state constitution also dictates the methods that are used to appoint
each university’s regents and trustees. This is a topic of much controversy within
Michigan, as there are two different methods utilized to establish the governing boards.
The state constitution essentially splits the thirteen boards into two classes of
development: elected and governor appointed. The University of Michigan, Wayne State
University, and Michigan State University regents are all elected at-large by the citizens
of the state of Michigan, while the remaining boards such as those at Lake Superior State
University, Western Michigan University, and Oakland University, are all made by
governor appointment 9 . The controversy here, aside from general arguments over which
method is best for the quality of education within the state institutions, is over the fact
that the three largest universities have a much different method of choosing governing
8
9

“Michigan’s Higher Education System: A guide for state policymakers” Ferris State University, 2003
Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article X Sections 5-6
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board members than the smaller schools, creating the perception of a two-tiered system of
higher education.
Arguments have been made against both election and governor appointment for
determining governing board members. It has been claimed that electing the board
members is not the best method because the entire state does not necessarily have a direct
stake in the operations of all of the universities. The idea here is that although people
living in southeastern Michigan near Detroit may be more inclined to play an active role
at selecting regents at Oakland University or Wayne State University since they are
located near where the people live and are major influences in the local economy, those
same people may not have as large a stake in the success of Northern Michigan
University, which is located on the opposite side of the state in the Upper Peninsula,
almost 600 miles away. The people and groups who stand behind this argument favor
governor appointment or altering election procedures so that regents are elected within
districts or other boundaries that are more local to the respective university, similar to
how community college governing board members are elected.
On the other hand, opponents of governor appointed board members argue that
since the governor belongs to a particular political party, he or she will most likely
appoint board members that belong to that party. They assert that because regents serve
eight-year terms and governors serve four-year terms, it is possible to have a governor
belonging to one political party appoint half of a university’s board, and then have a
governor from the opposite political party appoint the other half of the board, leaving a
politically split board, causing the operations of the university to be based very much on
politics rather than the best interests of the institution. Opponents claim that this is also a
15

problem when you have regents of the same political party, since voices from the other
side of the aisle are perceived to be stifled. This insurgence of politics in the university
governance is the complete antithesis of the rationale for having autonomous universities
in the first place, which was discussed earlier. Opponents of governor appointments as
the method for determining regents tend to support elections and other manners of
popular selection.
Michigan has a structure of public higher education that is one of independence
and autonomy. I discuss later how this separation impacts the budget process, the ability
to have shared governance within the institutions, and other aspects of higher education.
Michigan is very distinct from both the state of Wisconsin university system and, as you
will see, from Ohio’s public higher education, which makes Michigan a fine paradigm
case for analysis.

Ohio, the Hybrid State
State Institutions and Estimated Enrollment 10
Univ. of Akron
24,000
Bowling Green State
21,000
Central State
1,600
Cleveland State
16,000
Univ. of Cincinnati
35,000
Kent State
34,000
Miami
16,500

Ohio State
Ohio
Shawnee State
Univ. of Toledo
Wright State
Youngstown State

52,600
19,000
3,800
19,300
17,000
12,900

If one were to compare the states’ higher education structures to the plans for the
United States government proposed at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Wisconsin
would be the New Jersey Plan, with a strong, centralized government (the main UW

10

Enrollment data from the University System of Ohio (2008)
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Board of Regents) and little power given to the states (universities, in this example).
Michigan would represent the Virginia plan, granting authority and autonomy to the
states (the individual universities) with very little national presence (no overarching
governing body aside from the legislature and state constitution). Ohio is like the Great
Compromise, taking parts from both plans to create a system of governance. Wisconsin
and Michigan each have very different methods of operating their institutions of public
higher education. In Ohio, however, pieces of both structures are evident.
As in Michigan, each of the thirteen public universities in the state of Ohio has its
own board of governance, called the Board of Trustees. The boards are granted a certain
amount of authority to enact policies on their campuses by the state, and are the
administrative body for their respective campuses. Still, these boards and the
administrators at the Ohio universities report to the Ohio Board of Regents, a powerful
oversight organization that functions in a similar manner to the University of Wisconsin’s
Board of Regents. Led by a head Chancellor and several Vice Chancellors, the
University System of Ohio Board of Regents handles policy-making and the authority for
general control over the entire system of public higher education in the state of Ohio,
including 2-year community colleges 11 . With elements of the autonomy and individual
governance found in the state of Michigan and the systematic function with the inclusion
of a state board of control found in the state of Wisconsin, Ohio has been labeled a
“hybrid” structure of public higher education for comparative purposes. Ohio’s public
higher education system has benefits and detriments from both structures, but is able to

11

The University System of Ohio (2008)
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develop its educational offerings by combining the various aspects of operations found in
the other two states.
One aspect that makes Ohio stand out from the other two states is where the
majority of authority lies for the governance of the system. Rather than have the head of
the system serve at the will of the board of control (similar to how most top executive
positions operate at most institutions and higher education systems), the Ohio Board of
Regents serves as an advisory board to the Ohio Chancellor, who serves as the highest
authority for the University System of Ohio. The Chancellor is appointed by the
governor and is the head of the system, presiding over all of the Ohio public universities.
This shift in power has only come about recently, as it was enacted in 2007. Prior to
2007 the division of power was reversed, with the Chancellor having little power and
reporting to the Board of Regents.

Governance
Each of the states has a different structure for administering its public universities.
Some states utilize autonomy in the way that Michigan does, allowing each institution to
govern itself with a separate board of control, like the Board of Regents found at the
“directional” schools (Western Michigan, Eastern, and Central). Other states grant the
bulk of administrative authority to one governing board that determines policies and
operations for an entire system of universities, which is the method the state of Wisconsin
applies to its University of Wisconsin system. And then there are the states that mix a
bit of both structures together, having both individual boards for each university while
18

also having a centralized body to govern over the system of institutions. Ohio is such as
state, granting some authority to each university’s Board of Trustees like the one found at
Ohio State University, but there is also the Ohio Board of Regents to oversee and
administer above each of those institutional boards.
In this section I will dive deeper into each of the three states’ forms of governance
and administration at its highest level, the boards of control. The discussion will include
the composition and selection of the boards, the various levels of authority granted to the
different types of boards (such as the ability to see tuition and fees, change campus
policies, grant degrees, etc), and the interaction between those boards and other members
of their respective higher education communities (especially the level of difficulty in
influencing board decisions and policy changes).

Sources of Authority
A significant difference between Michigan and the other two states included in
this analysis regarding the governance of public universities is in regards to where
important structural information is found. Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan all have
volumes of state laws and codes applying to their respective public higher education
structures, such as how state appropriations are allocated (see the chapter on the state
budget and higher education appropriations for details on this), campus safety and health
standards, and even the official declaration of the names of each institution. However,
aside from the simple statement in Wisconsin’s document requiring a state university be

19

created somewhere near Madison 12 and a short section in The Ohio Constitution allowing
for state loan and tuition credit programs for state college students 13 , there is little to no
mention of higher education in the Wisconsin and Ohio state constitutions. In
Michigan’s state constitution, on the other hand, there are four sections establishing the
state’s public universities and community colleges and stating specifically how the
members of the governing boards at the institutions are selected, as well as information
outlining state appropriations to the universities 14 . This information for Wisconsin and
Ohio can only be found in the respective state laws and codes.
This difference is very important to notice because of the difficulty in changing
state constitutions versus state code or law. For Michigan, changing the method of
selection for its universities’ governing boards would take an elaborate effort of either the
passage of a bill through both state congressional houses or through citizen petitioning of
several hundred thousand signatures (depending on the voter turnout of the most recent
gubernatorial election), followed by a statewide vote of the change during the next
general election (where most ballot initiatives have historically failed) 15 . To make the
same change in Ohio or Wisconsin, the state legislature in each state would simply have
to change the section of state law that governs board membership – comparatively a
much simpler and less difficult process. Essentially, the authority to govern the public
institutions of higher education is granted on a higher level in Michigan than it is in Ohio
and Wisconsin based on where that information is located and the difficulty in changing
it. Thus, either Michigan has historically placed more importance on the functioning of
12

Wisconsin Constitution, Article X Section 6.
The Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Sections 5-6
14
Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article VIII Sections 5-8
15
Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article XII Sections 1-2
13
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its public universities and colleges than the other two states, or Wisconsin and Ohio are
more accepting to changing their systems than Michigan.

Administrative Composition and Selection
Along with the source that grants authority being different among the three states,
the size of the governing boards in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio regardless of the level
of authority is significantly different. As defined by Michigan’s state constitution, each
of the fifteen public universities has a board of control consisting of eight members with
the university’s president serving ex-officio (with the three University of Michigan
campuses – Flint, Ann Arbor, and Dearborn – sharing one board) 16 . The even number of
board members at each institution often results in a tying vote of 4-4, with the university
president given the ability to break the tie. All members serve eight year terms, staggered
in a manner that allows for two open seats every two years, which are determined in one
of two ways (these methods are quite controversial, as discussed in the Michigan state
overview section). First, per the state constitution the members of the board of control at
the three largest universities, the University of Michigan campus system, Michigan State
University, and Wayne State University, are all elected by the state’s population at-large
in the general election 17 . Each candidate for board member office is listed on the ballot
with the inclusion of his or her party affiliation.
The second method of selection, which applies to the remaining ten universities,
is by gubernatorial appointment. Every two years the current Michigan governor
16
17

Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article X Sections 5-6
Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article X Section 5
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appoints or reappoints (with consent of the Senate) two members to each university
governing board 18 . While the appointment process is open to any Michigan resident, the
process almost always results in a political appointee that matches the political party
affiliation of the governor who is making the appointment. This reality, the even number
of board members, four-year governor terms, and the staggering of open board seats can
easily lead to four Republicans and four Democrats serving on one governing board,
often causing ties in voting and giving university presidents more authority to enact and
change campus policies through casting tie-breaking votes as ex-officio members of their
boards.
All of Michigan’s university boards of control operate independently of each
other, with only the state legislature (through the passage of laws) and the governor
(through board member appointments) having any potential authority above them.
Michigan’s Administrative Makeup
Individual Institutional Boards (8 members)

Respective Institutions
Direction of Presiding Authority

On the completely opposite side of the structural spectrum, the University of
Wisconsin system grants nearly all its governing authority to one Board of Regents. The
18

Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Article X Section 6
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UW Board of Regents consists of 18 members, all selected by gubernatorial appointment.
Each Regent is appointed to a term of seven years with two exceptions: two students who
serve as full voting members of the board and hold two-year terms. In regards to the
student members, the governor appoints a traditional student (one who graduates from
high school and immediately attends college the following fall, also known as a
FTIAC 19 ) and a nontraditional student (often a much older student, having entered the
workforce instead of attending college following high school) to serve on the board in
order to expand the notion of shared governance. There is also a system president for the
University of Wisconsin, who serves in a similar role as the individual university
presidents in Michigan, except for the entire network of Wisconsin colleges and
universities. Instead of the autonomous boards of control at each university, however,
each Wisconsin institution employs a chancellor as its chief administrator (at the local
level). All of the chancellors report to the system president (who in turn reports to the
UW Board of Regents) 20 . The UW Board of Regents is considered the top level of
administration for the university system, with of course the influence of political
appointment by the governor of Wisconsin.

19
20

“First Time in Any College”
University of Wisconsin System, 2008
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Wisconsin’s Administrative Makeup
UW Board of Regents (18 members)

UW System President

Individual UW Institutions (Chancellors)

Direction of Presiding Authority

Ohio, which takes the “hybrid” approach by bringing together elements of the
University of Wisconsin system and the autonomy of governance found in Michigan, has
both a system-wide Board of Regents and individual boards of trustees for each public
university. The Board of Trustees at The Ohio State University consists of 17 members,
while the remaining twelve universities each have eleven-member entities. All of the 13
Ohio public universities have two student trustees who serve as nonvoting members of
their respective boards 21 . As in Michigan, these institutional boards regulate their
respective institutions, but at the same time report to the system-wide Ohio Board of
Regents, like the structure found in Wisconsin. The Ohio Board of Regents is made up of
nine people and a system chancellor (a position similar to the UW President). Unlike
Wisconsin, however, the Ohio Chancellor is given much more authority within the higher
education system than the Ohio Board of Regents, which is appointed as an advisory
board. Also in contrast to Wisconsin’s method for selecting the system president, the
21
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Ohio Chancellor is appointed by the governor rather than hired by the Board of Regents,
a process that solidifies the Chancellor’s higher level of authority within the higher
education system 22 .

Ohio’s Administrative Makeup
Ohio Board of Regents
(9 members)

Ohio Chancellor

Individual Institutional Boards (16 or 11 members)

Respective Institutions
Direction of Presiding Authority

Students as Regents
The idea of having enrolled students as members of the highest authority of public
higher education is one that is often of great controversy. States that have them are often
debating whether they should keep them, while states without student trustees or regents
debate whether they should add them. Wisconsin and Ohio, which have two different
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approaches to providing students the opportunity to serve as lead administrators to their
universities, are not the only states with student board members. The University of
California system, University of Massachusetts system, and the University of Oregon
system all have student board members, as well as many other large universities and
higher education systems across the United States. Some are granted full voting
members, such as the two serving on the UW Board of Regents, while others, like the
two at each of the Ohio public universities, sit at the table but are not granted voting
privileges. Student regents are chosen in a variety of methods, including appointment by
the board itself (California) 23 , by governor appointment (Wisconsin and Ohio), and
through student election (Louisiana) 24 , among others.
The controversy over student regents is focused on three main arguments: an
argument on shared governance equity, an argument on required experience and age for
effectiveness, and the final argument on the “in-and-out” career of a student. The
argument regarding shared governance equity revolves around the perception that
students are given the opportunity to serve on the governing board as a way to increase
the sharing of governance amongst the higher education community. Students are
viewed as the primary constituents, possibly even “customers” from a business
standpoint, and are brought into the administrative positions as a representative for
feedback on the educational quality and offerings of the institution or system. This is the
same philosophy behind corporations that allow stockholders to serve on their boards, or
nonprofits that offer board positions to the people they serve. While this is acceptable to
many members of the higher education community, there is outcry from faculty, staff,
23
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and alumni, claiming that they should also be included in the shared governance of the
university or system in the same manner as students. They argue that if students are to
have a seat (or in some cases more than one) on the board of control, then there should
also be a representative seat for faculty, one for staff members, and so on. Since adding
more seats or changing the way seats are allocated is often a severely difficult process
(especially in cases like Michigan where it requires a constitutional amendment through a
citizen vote), those who claim this method of shared governance is inequitable would
rather there not be any student regents at all.
Another argument against students as regents is the potentially young age of
students being considered for the board positions. In the case of FTIACS or traditional
students, candidates for student regent positions may only be 19 or 20 years old, with
only a few years of experience in a college setting, let alone any administrative or
decision-making experience. It is argued that students who have barely learned to live on
their own away from their parents and guardians are not at all equipped to make major
decisions that impact not only the thousands of students and employees at their respective
institutions, but also the overall level of educational quality in that state, depending on the
schools administered by that particular board. Opponents argue that issues like collective
bargaining with faculty and staff unions, budget development, and disciplinary policies
are too complex for someone with no “real life” experience (especially within the higher
education field) to be able to make a well-informed decision, opponents argue. The main
point for this argument is that the idea of having students as board members is potentially
dangerous to the university or system and the people affected by it.

27

The third and final major argument against student regents is about the length of
time a student is associated with a particular institution or system, due to the typical
amount of time it takes to earn an undergraduate degree. Typically, board members are
appointed for at least six-year terms, which is longer than the four or five years it takes to
complete an undergraduate or even graduate degree at a public institution. Assuming that
students competing to become board members have completed at least a year of their
academic program, they would only be students for three or four more years at best,
resulting in a much shorter board member term. This is perceived as problematic by
opponents to student regents for two reasons. First, since students are only sticking
around for four or five years total to finish their degree, and are then moving on to other
ambitions such as entering the workforce, they may not have the long-term interests of
the university or system in mind, but rather make decisions only on the basis of their few
years as a student. This argument is especially aimed at budget decisions, and it is
claimed that students will be more willing to approve spending that will be “quick fixes”
to financial issues but will not work out well in the long term. Secondly, because
students have only recently arrived at the particular university or system to begin their
academic work, and assuming that most traditional students are not engrossed in the
operation and activities of their future alma mater during middle school and high school,
student regents have very little background and historical knowledge about their
constituency. This information could be vital to a board member in avoiding a decision
that repeats past mistakes or is not in line with institutional values and tradition.
In order to address these arguments and still have students serve in some capacity
on university or system governing boards, compromises have been made in several
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circumstances. For example, the age and experience argument has been ameliorated in
Wisconsin through the appointment of a nontraditional student as well as a traditional
student. The development of faculty and staff advisory councils and boards that are
given the ability to heavily influence governing board decisions has been a method for
addressing the argument of inequitable shared governance. And restricting student
regents to only having speaking privileges rather than being full voting members has
helped to stave off the problem of both inexperience and short “student lifespan.”

Distribution of Powers and Authority
While Michigan’s distribution of power (in terms of who gets to decide what) is
quite straightforward, Ohio and Wisconsin have a more complex division of authority.
Each of Michigan’s public universities has the state constitutional ability to fully operate
and regulate itself through its governing board and executive administration. Tuition and
fees, campus policies, academic programs, and human resource decisions, among others,
are made for each university by each university. The Michigan state legislature can
change the codes and laws that affect higher education on a macro level, such as general
campus safety standards, academic accreditation and licensing (especially for teachers,
health care workers, and other professionals graduating from the institutions), and
appropriations and capital project funding, but for the most part each university is left up
to its own devices to determine what works best for itself.
This is not the case in Wisconsin or Ohio. In Wisconsin, there is division of
authority between the chancellors (a position similar to the president of the university)
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and the UW Board of Regents, with the Board holding the majority of power. The UW
Board of Regents, according to the UW System website information, “sets admission
standards, reviews and approves university budgets, and establishes the regulatory
framework within which the individual units operate.25 ” The Board also appoints all of
the university chancellors and other lead executives 26 for all of the institutions within the
system. This means that the UW Board of Regents has the power to set tuition and fees
for all of the universities and set policies that the entire system must follow. It also
means that the chancellors and their administrations are given authority to enact policies
at their respective institutions by the UW Board policies, and can only take action in a
manner that is within the guidelines passed down to them. For example, one of the
Regents’ policies is that the final determination of a student’s residency (in order to
determine whether a student receives the reduced tuition rate for being a Wisconsin
resident) is left up to the chancellor of each university, who is granted the authority to
develop his or her own method of making that determination27 . There are several
sections in the Board Policy Document that delegate specifically the various capacities
the individual universities have to develop and enact changes in policies at the “local”
level. The bottom line is that if there is a major policy to be made or changed (like
tuition), then it is most likely that the UW Board of Regents will have the power to make
that change, and if it is a smaller and more localized policy change (for example, banning
smoking on campus), the individual university will typically be granted the authority (by
the UW Board) to act.
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This includes the deans of the 2-year colleges and the chancellors for the UW-Extension
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There is a similar division of power in Ohio, except that there is less direct
authority granted to the Ohio Chancellor and Ohio Board of Regents. Rather, the
individual governing boards of the universities are given more authority to govern their
institution than administrations in Wisconsin. The Ohio Board of Regents acts as an
advisory board to the Ohio Chancellor, whose main responsibilities are to distribute state
funding allocations from the state legislature to the universities (as discussed more indepth in an upcoming section) and to approve new academic programs. The boards of
control of the universities are granted nearly all of the remaining powers, including
setting tuition and fees, making human resource decisions, enacting policies and
developing campus capital projects. It could be said that rather than having the
universities report to the Chancellor and the Board of Regents through a direct governing
relationship (such as is the case in Wisconsin), Ohio’s university administrations operate
similarly to those in Michigan (aside from not being able to approve their own academic
programs).

Analysis
By looking at the power division and the structure of authority within each state,
we are able to determine whether or not a particular administrator has the ability to enact
or change a specific policy, such as raising tuition or adding a new degree program. This
helps us, as members of the higher education community, to find the “decision-makers”
on issues that we feel are important. For example, if the students at one of the University
of Wisconsin institutions want their student center to be renovated, then by knowing that
it is the UW Board of Regents that holds the power (and not their campus administrators)
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to approve building construction and capital projects, the students will be able to direct
their renovation campaign at the people who can actually help them. Once the “decisionmakers” have been determined, efforts to influence those decisions can begin.
Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan each have a different level of difficulty for a nonboard member or administrator to influence authoritative decisions (like building
renovations or tuition rates) based on the makeup of the power and authority structure.
There are two categories of decisions that I am considering. The first category contains
decisions on policies and issues that are designed to affect the entire state’s higher
education structure. This may include enacting a student fee for a state-wide student
association that all students within the state have to pay, or creating a state-wide course
textbook database that allows students to easily access information about the books they
need for their upcoming courses. The second category includes decisions that are
designed to only have an effect on an individual institution. These can be issues like
program fees for a specific campus program, or the addition of a new academic degree
program.
Regarding the decisions and issues in category one (i.e. the macro level), the
University of Wisconsin system is best equipped to make these with the least difficulty,
due to its centralized main governing body (the UW Regents). In order to influence the
creation or change of a system-wide policy, students at the UW institutions can organize
together to lobby the UW Regents, who then can make one policy for all of the
universities. This is a frequent occurrence, actually, as the United Council of UW
Students is an organization founded to organize students around state-wide issues and
lobby the UW Regents, and even the state legislature, for policy changes (like their
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current campaign to have the UW guidelines and penalties for non-academic misconduct
to be altered in order to protect students from double punishment) 28 .
Ohio ranks second in this area of state-wide actions, with its Chancellor and Ohio
Board of Regents able to enact some policies that affect all of the universities within the
state. However, this power is nowhere near as comprehensive as that wielded by the UW
Board of Regents, since the majority of authority is granted to the individual Ohio
institutions. In other words, issues like budgets, tuition and fees, and academic program
guidelines can be changed on a state level, but most other decisions are made at the local,
institutional level. For example, in order to have all of the Ohio schools become smokefree, each campus would have to approve its own version of that sort of policy
autonomously. Of course, the state legislature could also pass laws that would affect all
of the universities, but that is not a common occurrence considering a historical state
philosophy of leaving the higher education system to govern itself.
Ranking last in the first category is the state of Michigan, which has virtually no
ability to make state-wide policies aside from state legislature action (a reminder that the
convention delegates for the current constitution were adamantly opposed to government
interference in the state’s public higher education). Since each university functions
independently of the others, including in determining tuition and fee rates and approving
academic programs, the only way to have the same policy at each institution would be to
influence each of the fifteen universities into enacting that policy individually. For
example, if students at the Michigan universities began a campaign to change the judicial
services codes in a way that is similar to the efforts being made by the United Council of
28
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UW Students, they would have to lobby each governing board individually. Since every
board responds to different methods of lobbying and influences, essentially it would
require twelve different campaigns in order to have a chance at having every school pass
the same policy. Chances are that at least one university would reject the proposal,
leaving some institutions having the wanted policy and the rest without it. It is very
difficult, if not impossible, to have any sort of state-wide decision made without the state
legislature passing a related law.
For category two the ranks are reversed, with Michigan leading the pack on
making institutional decisions. The reasons preventing state-wide policies are the support
for the ease of individual universities making policies and deciding on issues that are
designed to only impact them. Michigan’s universities run autonomously and
independently, so all the decisions their governing boards make are designed to affect
their own institution. It also helps that there is not a higher level of authority (aside from
the state legislature) above each board of control, so there are not any specific guidelines
or boundaries for the authority found at each school. Ohio ranks second in this category
of decisions and possesses a large amount of institutional autonomy. With the Ohio
Chancellor only authorized to make decisions regarding budgetary issues and academic
programs, most of the power to govern an individual university falls on the universities
themselves. The institutions in Ohio do not have as much independence as the schools in
Michigan, but they have a significantly higher amount of freedom than the members of
the UW system. Wisconsin, which brings up the rear in this category, has strict
boundaries that determine the decisions that can be made by the chancellors and campus
administrators at each of the thirteen UW universities. Most policies and major decisions
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are made at the state-wide level, even for those that will affect only one or two
universities. Thus the University of Wisconsin institutions have the least amount of
authority to enact policies at the local level.

Budgets and Funding
Money makes the world go ‘round, at least in higher education. While there are
efforts at many institutions to push fundraising and develop a base of donors, public
universities are for the most part funded by two categories of money: appropriations
from the state government and the tuition and fees paid by students. When one segment
of this financial combination changes (most likely it is state appropriations decreasing, as
this is the recent trend throughout the nation), so must the other in a proportional amount,
unless a school makes extraordinary cuts in their operating budget. Since tuition is thus
mostly based on the amount of state appropriations a university receives, it is important
to investigate and analyze the processes that states use to decide how much its institutions
of public higher education will earn each budget cycle. How do the universities and/or
systems fit into the state budget processes? Who decides how much money is allocated
to each institution, and are these the same people or entities that determine tuition? Here,
I answer these questions while discussing the distinct budget processes and financial
issues in each of the three case study states.
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Annual and Biennium Budgets
One aspect of the state budget processes that sets Ohio and Wisconsin apart from
Michigan is the fact that the state governments in Ohio and Wisconsin run on a biennium
(2-year) budget while Michigan operates on an annual structure. This means that all of
the state departments and entities, including the higher education systems, know how
much money they will be allocated during the next two years following the
implementation of the state budget, thus providing for a significant amount of
forethought to be made prior to making any financial decisions such as setting tuition
rates. During better state economic times, when appropriations are stable or increasing
over the two fiscal years, the biennium budget can be very beneficial to the university
systems and its students, often leading to lower increases in tuition. In fact, Ohio has
placed a tuition freeze, meaning no increases in tuition, for the next two years due to
stable funding from the state legislature 29 .
A biennium budget, however, is not as flexible as Michigan’s annual budget,
which is able to address rapid changes in the economy, state population, and trends
instead of setting a budget that might be completely remade in the middle of the fiscal
year. With the annual budget, there is not as much foresight regarding the amount of
appropriations to be received, but the ability to make decisions year-to-year can be a
benefit, especially in a state that is stuck in an economic recession and has found itself in
a deficit for several years 30 . Both the biennium and annual budget processes have their
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merits and detriments, especially relating to their influence on higher education
appropriations.

The Higher Education Appropriations Processes
Wisconsin’s official appropriation process begins, like the budget process in all
states, with the proposal of the biennium budget by the governor to the state legislature.
Before that happens in January of an even-numbered year 31 , however, there is a separate
process occurring in the UW system. Prior to November 20 on odd-numbered years,
each of the University of Wisconsin schools, including the 2-year institutions, determines
its budget needs for the next two fiscal years. They submit this amount to the UW Board
of Regents, which then compiles its version of these reports and send it to the governor
for consideration. The governor considers this request from the UW system, just as he
does for all of the Wisconsin state entities and departments, and then includes his
recommended appropriation amount in his proposed budget that is sent to the state
legislature.
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Wisconsin’s Appropriations Process
Governor proposes budget

State legislature approves budget

UW Board of Regents receives funds

Funding allocated to universities by Regents

It is important to note here that the funding amount included on the state
executive budget is a lump sum figure allocated to the UW Board of Regents for further
allocation at their discretion. Once the biennium budget is approved by the Wisconsin
state legislature, the UW Board of Regents is granted the money to distribute to the
system’s institutions. This means that the UW Board of Regents has the power to
prioritize one institution over another, allocating funding to universities in a manner that
reflects the board members’ wishes and agendas. The Regents also have the authority to
set tuition rates, so they have quite a bit of power when it comes to financial issues within
the UW system. Also, the universities are competing not only with each other, but also
with the 2-year colleges, making the push for higher funding a fight for a bigger piece of
the appropriations “pie.” Thus each university is lobbying the UW Board of Regents in
competition with its familial institutions, pushing to receive a higher share of funds than
the others. The UW system schools also work together to lobby the state legislature for
an overall larger “pie” through increasing the lump sum figure that is granted to the UW
Regents every two years.
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Ohio’s appropriations process runs similarly to Wisconsin’s, with a biennium
budget that begins every other July. The state legislature allocates a lump sum amount to
the Ohio Chancellor and Board of Regents, which then distributes funds to each of the
thirteen universities, as well as the other 2-year colleges and extensions. The same
competition issues apply in Ohio as they do in Wisconsin, with the community colleges
and universities fighting for allocations from the same large fund.
Ohio’s Appropriations Process
Governor proposes budget

State legislature approves budget

Ohio Chancellor (advised by Regents) receives funds

Funding allocated to universities by Chancellor

The main difference here from Wisconsin is that tuition is set by the universities,
rather than the Chancellor or Board of Regents. This gives the universities a bit more
ability to compete against the priorities of the Chancellor. Where in Wisconsin the UW
Board of Regents sets tuition and distributes funds, controlling the total amount of
operating funds each university has, a university in Ohio has a better ability to offset any
reduction in funding through increasing tuition and fees.
Unlike in Wisconsin or Ohio, Michigan’s university appropriations are not
filtered by any entity between the state legislature and the schools themselves.
Appropriations are granted directly to the universities upon approval of the budget. Thus
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the higher education appropriations process in Michigan is fairly straightforward and
short (not necessarily in time, but in the number of people involved). Also, instead of
one lump sum amount allocated to the universities, each institution is appropriated
separately as a line item in the executive budget. When the governor of Michigan
releases her budget proposal each January or February 32 , under the section labeled
“Higher Education” one can find a line item for each of the fifteen universities 33 . It is
important to note that even the three University of Michigan campuses are included as
separate items during allocation, rather than granting the money to the main campus (Ann
Arbor) to filter it through to the other two (Dearborn and Flint).

Michigan’s Appropriations Process

Governor proposes budget

State legislature approves budget

Funding allocated to universities as individual line items

Because of the individualistic method of allocation for the Michigan universities,
the officials and administration at those institutions are not necessarily competing with
each other for state funds. Unlike Ohio and Wisconsin, there is no “pie” to fight over for
the biggest piece, but rather there exists the potential for the legislature and governor to
grant each university all of the money they want, if only there were enough money to be
32
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allocated. Instead the universities typically work independently in their lobbying efforts,
pushing to increase the amount of money the legislature allocates to their respective
institutions. The ability to prioritize one university over another lies with the state
legislature, whereas that power sits in the other states with the Ohio Chancellor and the
UW Regents. If the state legislature feels that research and technology are priorities this
fiscal year, then they would most likely allocate more funds to the universities that excel
in those areas, such as the University of Michigan or Michigan State. On the flip side, if
they would rather increase the number of teachers available in Michigan, then money
would probably go to schools with larger teacher education programs, like Eastern
Michigan University or Central Michigan University. The way the appropriations
process works in Michigan allows for more economic and educational influence by the
state legislature when it comes time to make budget decisions. If the state legislature
feels that a particular school is not producing as much of a certain kind of profession as
another school, it will be reflected in the funding figures.
Another thing that is different between Michigan and the other two states is that
the “Higher Education” section of the state budget is separate from the “Community
College” section, meaning that the 2-year colleges and the 4-year universities are
addressed individually rather than as one budget item like in Wisconsin and Ohio.
Because community colleges in Michigan are allocated separately from universities, there
is very little competition between the two segments of higher education, and they can be
viewed like as distinct state departments.
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Fiscal Year Fun
An aspect of the financial and budget processes that is quite intriguing deals with
the fiscal years of the state and its respective public universities. In Wisconsin and Ohio,
both the state governments and the public higher education systems run on a July-June
fiscal year structure. The Michigan state government operates on an October-September
fiscal year while the universities begin their fiscal years in July. On top of fiscal
calendars, universities have to appeal to the academic calendar, which runs from the
beginning of September through the end of August (similar to the K-12 systems). Tuition
rates are typically set at the end of June, when the upcoming fiscal year budget is
approved. The ability to have the state budget begin at the same time as the university
budget is incredibly beneficial since the administration within the universities has a better
sense of the amount of state appropriations it will be receiving, and thus can determine a
more appropriate rate of tuition. For the Michigan institution administrators, tuition rates
and budget decisions are often based more on educated guesses than exact figures,
especially in the past few years when the passage of the state budget has gone down to
the wire on the night of required approval (Midnight on September 30). This gap
between fiscal years can complicate the budget processes, both at the state and university
level, since not having a concrete figure other than the one that is proposed by the
governor can make the administration at a university set tuition rates too low or too high,
depending on the information they possess at the time.

42

Conclusion
It is difficult to determine whether there is a better structure of public higher
education. Each state and its variation of a structure, whether it is implementing a system
or allowing autonomous operation, has benefits and detriments. For example, the
complete autonomy found in Michigan is effective in allowing universities to tailor their
programs and policies to best serve their respective students. The centralized authority
found in the University of Wisconsin system, however, is most appropriate and efficient
for enacting policies that impact all of the universities. While this study focuses
primarily on structural issues relating to governance and budget processes, there are
many more aspects of public higher education that, if analyzed, would support or detract
from the analysis completed so far. By looking closely at Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin, I have been able to begin an investigation into all of our nation’s public
higher education, from the schools in Maine to the institutions in California.
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